Luther vs Anabaptists! - Page 3

[Bluegoat]

I've been a while getting back to this; I was looking for a book I've got that discusses this issue, and was alas unable to find it. I did find a very interesting account of Chesterton describing Calvinism as a kind of dualism

Originally Posted by Smokering

I disagree. This is a common contention levelled at Calvinism, but I've never heard it argued, only assumed. Why does responsibility necessitate free will?

Applying the term "responsibility" to God is a little strange; responsibility is a relational term, and God is not responsible to anyone. He is certainly the first cause of our actions, but that is a different thing. As under the Calvinist model humans consent to and perform evil with the entirely of their wills, how is it inappropriate to hold them responsible for their actions? I'm sure God doesn't hold them responsible for being the first cause.

No, I am not sure that it is a relational term, as long as there is something other than God. That is, if there was only God, unified, perfect, and unchanging, it would seem odd to talk about responsibility. Although, one could perhaps discuss his self-existent non-contingent nature by saying he was responsible for himself, not that there would be anyone to say such a thing.

A pantheistic universe would come to a similar conclusion, perhaps.

But as Christians, we believe creation is not part of God, which allows us to talk about other kinds of causes. And responsibility in this sense is closely related to causation. (Are you responsible for this mess young lady?!)

With regards to moral responsibility and free will; people who cannot understand moral choices, or who cannot act on them, are not understood to be responsible or culpable for their own behavior. So a kleptomaniac who understands that stealing is wrong, but is compelled to do it anyway, it not totally responsible. We might say that she should have sought help, or done something about her problem. On the other hand, all power of choice was beyond her, her moral responsibility would be a silly thing to talk about.

However, a more difficult problem, and I think what Chesterton was speaking about, is that without free will, God directly becomes the cause of evil - which is of course not a possibility. So better to say - evil and good cease to become meaningful terms. Moral responsibility is then not something people can have, as there is no moral choice.

Unless there are free moral agents in the universe who can choose "not God" immorality is impossible.

DD here wants me, so I will have to finish this up for mow.

[Smokering]

I like Chesterton, but saywhat? I've always considered Arminianism to be flirting with dualism, not the other way around.

I think God's non-contingency is an important concept here. Yes, things exist other than God, but unless God "owes" His creation something or is interdependent with it, it seems odd to talk of Him having responsibility towards it. I believe that goodness comes from God's nature, not that it is an external standard to which God has to measure up; so God certainly isn't responsible to an external moral standard, nor is He responsible to us. He is "responsible" towards His own character, but as you say that's a funny way of putting it; bound by His own character is clearer. So the question becomes, is it intrinsically impossible for God's character to allow God to be the direct cause of sin? And I don't think it is. In fact, I think it's necessary to maintain the sovereignty of God, and to naturally exegete certain passages of Scripture which say that God caused people to do evil things. That doesn't mean God Himself is sinning - that would be a meaningless thing to say, as God isn't bound by the decrees He gives to human behavior (ie, it makes no sense to think of God stealing, as everything in the world is His).

I'm curious as to why you say it is not a possibility?

[Thao]

I'm not sure that this is a logical answer per se, but the thing that bothers me about this viewpoint is that the gulf between what is moral for God and what is moral for humans is so vast it seems to render definitions of morality absurd, as Bluegoat said. For example, genocide is good if committed by God, but bad if committed by man. I get what you are saying about the context being different - God can't be said to steal because everything is His -- but this goes beyond that. By human morality, God's actions in creating living thinking feeling beings and then destroying them at will (and sending them to eternal torment, no less) can only be considered extremely callous. Even if we could create life, we would still consider it callous and immoral to send that life to eternal torment. How then can human morality be said to emanate from God's nature?

Also, there are all the comparisons in the Bible between God and man -- man being created in God's image, exhortations to live a "godly" (i.e. like God) life, a man loving his wife like Christ loved the church etc etc. If there is very little in common between God's and man's morality, then such sentiments are rendered meaningless.

[TzippityDoulah]

Originally Posted by Thao

I'm not sure that this is a logical answer per se, but the thing that bothers me about this viewpoint is that the gulf between what is moral for God and what is moral for humans is so vast it seems to render definitions of morality absurd, as Bluegoat said. For example, genocide is good if committed by God, but bad if committed by man. I get what you are saying about the context being different - God can't be said to steal because everything is His -- but this goes beyond that. By human morality, God's actions in creating living thinking feeling beings and then destroying them at will (and sending them to eternal torment, no less) can only be considered extremely callous. Even if we could create life, we would still consider it callous and immoral to send that life to eternal torment. How then can human morality be said to emanate from God's nature?

Also, there are all the comparisons in the Bible between God and man -- man being created in God's image, exhortations to live a "godly" (i.e. like God) life, a man loving his wife like Christ loved the church etc etc. If there is very little in common between God's and man's morality, then such sentiments are rendered meaningless.

but see you're comparing our own limited insights to that of God. what may seem "callous" to you may be very purposeful and wonderful in a way we do not see or understand.

human are in the IMAGE of God... not the exact of God (or we would not need a saviour as we would be Gods). an image always falls short of what it is reflecting. it's never the same. and an image wouldn't be expected to be as in depth as the original. so we can't say our understanding of morality is complete. Even the human with the best possible understanding of morality is still human (image) and therefore can't possible under the way a creator (God) could. it's not a matter of fair and unfair or anything of that nature. I mean of course we can choose to look at it that way. and it may feel that way. but fi one believes God is the God of all, there has to be room for the fact that we are not God and without understanding.

ETA: the husband being like the way Christ loved the church - well that is a very deep thought. for one it isn't saying it is the same... it is saying it is "like" [an image]. not the same, but a clear comparison we can understand. there is also the belief (which I agree with that) that it is the same ina way we cannot understand. we cannot understand fully the bond that happens on a spiritual level between a man and a woman. we can try to understand it. but even feeling it deeply there aren't always reasons why it works the way it does. it just... does. it just is. much like the love of Christ for His church. it's on another elvel we can only get glimpses of.

[Thao]

Right, you know I get that because I am the one that is always saying on these threads that we can't possibly understand God. But to the extent that people believe they can understand God based on His revelation, the Bible links man's morality to God and Christian philosophers theorize that our morality is based on God's nature. But if God's morality is so vastly different from ours that we cannot possibly understand it, it seems to me that this means that we cannot have any meaningful discussions about what morality is.

Here's a thought experiment. Let's say man was capable of creating life. Would there be any circumstances, any at all, in which human morality would say it is good to create sentient life for eternal torment? I'd say no, no matter what eventual good may come out of it in the end for some. I'll go farther to say that this is not just me, but rather a pretty universal human moral sentiment. How then can our moral sense come from God? ETA: keep in mind that I am talking about the Calvinist view of God here, not the one that says evil and eternal torment are a result of man's free will.

[Smokering]

I'm not sure that this is a logical answer per se, but the thing that bothers me about this viewpoint is that the gulf between what is moral for God and what is moral for humans is so vast it seems to render definitions of morality absurd, as Bluegoat said.

Not absurd, just applied differently to different entities. Xhosa culture may be very different from Renaissance England culture, but that doesn't render the meaning of the word "culture" absurd. I think it's important to remember that the difference between God and man is of kind, not just degree. God can't "get away with" what He does on the grounds that He's a bigger, stronger human than we are. He's God. Any one of His incommunicable attributes - say, omnipotence or eternality - makes Him an entirely different animal to us.

Let's say man was capable of creating life. Would there be any circumstances, any at all, in which human morality would say it is good to create sentient life for eternal torment? I'd say no, no matter what eventual good may come out of it in the end for some.

I agree; but the flaw in that is that it would be wrong for man because we adhere to certain moral commandments given us by God. In fact, that morality is intrinsic to our nature, albeit flawed. The thought experiment, to be a proper analogy, would have to make us non-contingent beings creating ex nihilo, etc etc, until we ended up being functionally similar to God, in which case we wouldn't be human anyway and it wouldn't really be an analogy.

Nevertheless, I see your point: Scripture says God is good, but given the things God does that isn't always comforting in the short term! As humans we have a habit of reframing "God is good" into "God will do what I want"... so you hear people saying things like "God is good, He won't let my husband die" which seem kind of absurd in light of all the husbands God has let die in the past. I think we can have faith that God will do what is right in an ultimate sense, but we need to be wary about translating that into individual circumstances. Nevertheless, I do believe we'll get to heaven and realise, insofar as our still-limited intellects will let us, that everything that has happened throughout history was not only justified but necessary and right, and we wouldn't have had it any other way - even if we were the sufferers. And that's a heck of a lot more comforting than thinking everything is random or that God isn't in control of evil, or that God's actions are powerless to save people due to this mysterious entity known as free will.

And that's sort of the point of the book of Job, isn't it. To Job, God never explains why He's causing all this immense suffering; His answer is more along the lines of "You have no idea what you're talking about", and Job accepts that - rightly, according to the text. He's God; we're not.

[Thao]

Originally Posted by Smokering

I think it's important to remember that the difference between God and man is of kind, not just degree. God can't "get away with" what He does on the grounds that He's a bigger, stronger human than we are. He's God. Any one of His incommunicable attributes - say, omnipotence or eternality - makes Him an entirely different animal to us.

Fine, but in that case God is Unknowable. I'd accept that. But it seems that you want to have it both ways -- God is unknowable when it comes to the question of why it is good for Him to commit genocide, but knowable when it comes to other issues of morality or of logic, which (if I am remember correctly) you believe to be based in God's nature. If our logic and morality are based in God's nature, then there is some contiguity between humankind and God. On the other hand, if God is a completely different animal, then our morality couldn't be based on His nature.

To put it simply, how can our "good" be based on God, when His definition of the word is so radically different from ours (due to His radically different nature) as to be opposite of ours? How can the word have any meaning when the same act can be "good" or "bad" depending on who is doing it?

Originally Posted by Smokering

Nevertheless, I see your point: Scripture says God is good, but given the things God does that isn't always comforting in the short term! As humans we have a habit of reframing "God is good" into "God will do what I want"... so you hear people saying things like "God is good, He won't let my husband die" which seem kind of absurd in light of all the husbands God has let die in the past. I think we can have faith that God will do what is right in an ultimate sense, but we need to be wary about translating that into individual circumstances. Nevertheless, I do believe we'll get to heaven and realise, insofar as our still-limited intellects will let us, that everything that has happened throughout history was not only justified but necessary and right, and we wouldn't have had it any other way - even if we were the sufferers. And that's a heck of a lot more comforting than thinking everything is random or that God isn't in control of evil, or that God's actions are powerless to save people due to this mysterious entity known as free will.

This is soooo not what I was talking about! I don't have a problem with God putting people through earthly suffering and then the purpose of it all being revealed in Heaven. I have a problem with God creating sentient beings and then condemning billions of them to eternal torment for His purposes. Do you think that, when all is revealed, the people writhing in agony in Hell will stop for a moment to say, "Oh, I get it now, I wouldn't have it any other way, now let's have some more of that scalding oil"?

Job had a happy ending. There is no happy ending in Calvinism for a large portion of mankind. But why should this bother me, if my moral sense is based on God's nature?

[Smokering]

Fine, but in that case God is Unknowable. I'd accept that. But it seems that you want to have it both ways -- God is unknowable when it comes to the question of why it is good for Him to commit genocide, but knowable when it comes to other issues of morality or of logic, which (if I am remember correctly) you believe to be based in God's nature. If our logic and morality are based in God's nature, then there is some contiguity between humankind and God. On the other hand, if God is a completely different animal, then our morality couldn't be based on His nature.

God being different in kind to man doesn't make Him unknowable. I'm not sure the core concepts are hard to grasp: God's non-contingent, He doesn't "owe" us a good life/happiness/anything other than eternal torment. If we all went to hell it would be no more than we deserved, and it would be well within God's rights to put us there. The fact that God gives any of us any happiness at all is sheer grace, let alone redeeming some of us. Now, as God is bound by His own character and cannot lie, we can believe Him when He says He has an ultimate good purpose for all that He does. What exactly that purpose is, we don't know; theologians seem to have a vague consensus that it's to perfectly reflect His glory, but YMMV. To all that God is, including His wrath and mercy and justice and power, the Bible gives the label "good". I don't think there's anything "unknowable" about that; we may not like it, but it's intellectually not so hard to grasp.

Logic stems from God and is properly basic, so yes, I believe that God's logic and ours are essentially the same. Morality stems from God, but in a different way; His rules for humans obviously stem from Him in the sense that He issued those rules, but I don't think the rules themselves apply to Him, simply because it's nonsensical to apply them. God can't steal when everything's His; He wouldn't be likely to rape, being non-coporeal; coveting would hardly be an issue, and so on and so forth. And of course even the morals He gives to humans aren't absolute in one sense; it would have been immoral for Abram not to (nearly) kill Isaac, but immoral for other fathers to kill their sons. Ultimately evil is defined as going against God's decrees, and that can't really apply to God Himself.

To put it simply, how can our "good" be based on God, when His definition of the word is so radically different from ours (due to His radically different nature) as to be opposite of ours? How can the word have any meaning when the same act can be "good" or "bad" depending on who is doing it?

I think I've already answered this, but I'll just add that under the Christian worldview acts are good or bad depending on context all the time. Having sex with Mrs Smith? Good if you're Mr Smith, bad if you're Mr Jones. Killing a man? Good if he's aiming a gun at your child, bad if you want his money. Circumcising a baby? Good if you're Abraham, bad if you think intact penises are "gross". Dooming someone to eternal torment? Bad if you're human (not to mention impossible), good if you're omnipotent, omniscient, happen to know what you're doing and have a higher plan to fulfil.

Do you think that, when all is revealed, the people writhing in agony in Hell will stop for a moment to say, "Oh, I get it now, I wouldn't have it any other way, now let's have some more of that scalding oil"?

Will they enjoy being in hell: no. Will they recognise the justice and/or necessity of it? Depends on your view of hell - some people think the damned remain in a state of rebellion against God, others think they repent and suffer due to knowledge that they were wrong. I tend to go with the latter because of the "every knee shall bow and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord" verse. If that's the case, then I think they'll recognise the justice of hell, although I don't know that they'll be able to see the ultimate plan of God, given that their minds won't be regenerate.

Job had a happy ending. There is no happy ending in Calvinism for a large portion of mankind. But why should this bother me, if my moral sense is based on God's nature?

Because you're a sinner and your moral sense is faulty? Job did have a happy ending, but he repented before he got his flocks back; he recognised that he was no-one to question God, and that God had a right to do whatever He wanted with him, even if he were a "good man" according to all reasonable standards.

I realise it's not a fuzzy-wuzzy thought by any means, but what is your argument that it's not the case? "It would be evil for humans" doesn't fly, as God is qualitatively different from humans. "I think it's wrong" doesn't either, as the moral sense is a) fallen and b) meant to be informed by Scripture. "The Bible says that isn't the case" would work, but that argument has yet to be made.

[Thao]

Logic stems from God and is properly basic, so yes, I believe that God's logic and ours are essentially the same. Morality stems from God, but in a different way; His rules for humans obviously stem from Him in the sense that He issued those rules, but I don't think the rules themselves apply to Him, simply because it's nonsensical to apply them. God can't steal when everything's His; He wouldn't be likely to rape, being non-coporeal; coveting would hardly be an issue, and so on and so forth. And of course even the morals He gives to humans aren't absolute in one sense; it would have been immoral for Abram not to (nearly) kill Isaac, but immoral for other fathers to kill their sons. Ultimately evil is defined as going against God's decrees, and that can't really apply to God Himself.

Well, you are using examples of morality that wouldn't apply to God, but there are plenty of other examples that would. It is not nonsensical to apply Paul's exhortation to not cause others to sin, for example. Or Jesus' teaching that the entire law is summed up in loving God and loving your neighbor as yourself, which would presumably include not causing sentient beings to suffer, unless you love suffering. However, you are right that if you define "good" as obeying God's decrees and "bad" as going against God's decrees then it solves the problem, since God does not have to be bound by His decrees to humans. But in that case I don't think you can say that human morality stems from God's nature, since you are basically saying there is one morality for us, and another for God. Why is there only one set of logical rules, but two sets of moral rules?

I think I've already answered this, but I'll just add that under the Christian worldview acts are good or bad depending on context all the time. Having sex with Mrs Smith? Good if you're Mr Smith, bad if you're Mr Jones. Killing a man? Good if he's aiming a gun at your child, bad if you want his money. Circumcising a baby? Good if you're Abraham, bad if you think intact penises are "gross". Dooming someone to eternal torment? Bad if you're human (not to mention impossible), good if you're omnipotent, omniscient, happen to know what you're doing and have a higher plan to fulfil.

The acts may be good or bad depending on context, but the moral principles do not change depending on context. The reason why it is good for Mr. Smith to have sex with Mrs Smith but bad for Mr. Jones to do the same is because Mr. Jones would be committing adultery whereas Mr. Smith is not. The basic moral value -- that adultery is wrong -- does not change in that situation. Same with murder -- it is always bad. If someone is aiming a gun at your child, killing that person is a necessary evil, not a "good". (If God is all Good, by definition He can't do acts that are "necessary evil". He can change the circumstances so there is a Good solution. We as humans don't have that power.) Dooming a sentient being to eternal torment -- always bad, no matter how unconditioned and omnipotent the being is that is doing the dooming.

God's non-contingent, He doesn't "owe" us a good life/happiness/anything other than eternal torment. If we all went to hell it would be no more than we deserved, and it would be well within God's rights to put us there. The fact that God gives any of us any happiness at all is sheer grace, let alone redeeming some of us.

The thing is, it's not like God stumbled upon the world as is and is doing the best he can with a bad situation. He created it. If we are evil and degenerate, it is because he created us that way. You are right that he doesn't owe us anything, but that has nothing to do with the moral character of a Being who creates fallen beings and then punishes them with eternal torment for being fallen. That pretty well violates Jesus' injunction to love others as ourselves. I'm trying to think of a way that God's different character, being unconditioned and omnipotent and all, would make such an act moral under Jesus' injunction, and I can't. It also brings up the philosophical question of how a Good God could create Evil.

I realise it's not a fuzzy-wuzzy thought by any means, but what is your argument that it's not the case? "It would be evil for humans" doesn't fly, as God is qualitatively different from humans. "I think it's wrong" doesn't either, as the moral sense is a) fallen and b) meant to be informed by Scripture. "The Bible says that isn't the case" would work, but that argument has yet to be made.

I realize I am not being very clear about my argument, because I am trying to clarify it as I type. There seems to be an internal inconsistency in the Calvinist worldview. It wouldn't be a problem if the Bible was silent on God's nature and simply exhorted humans to follow God's laws because He made us and so is our Master. In that case, our morality would be based on God's commands rather than His nature, and it would not be illogical if God had a completely different morality. But that is not at all the tone of the Bible (so I guess my argument is a Biblical one). The Bible portrays God as Ultimate Good and Ultimate Love in nature and commands us to be like Him. But if His Goodness and Love are so different from ours as to be the opposite of ours (i.e. genocide is good), such injunctions seem absurd. To take it back to the issue of logic, it is like saying that logic is based on God's nature but doesn't apply to God.

ETA: as you know, I don't have a problem personally with the idea that logic doesn't apply to God but that is because I believe both logic and morality are based on human experience rather than emanating from Gods' nature. I am exploring Calvinism here and it seems to me that it is illogical to say on one hand that our sense of "Good" is based on God's "Good" but then on the other hand to say that God's "Good" is actually totally different so we can't be expected to understand it.

[TzippityDoulah]

Originally Posted by Thao

Right, you know I get that because I am the one that is always saying on these threads that we can't possibly understand God. But to the extent that people believe they can understand God based on His revelation, the Bible links man's morality to God and Christian philosophers theorize that our morality is based on God's nature. But if God's morality is so vastly different from ours that we cannot possibly understand it, it seems to me that this means that we cannot have any meaningful discussions about what morality is.

Here's a thought experiment. Let's say man was capable of creating life. Would there be any circumstances, any at all, in which human morality would say it is good to create sentient life for eternal torment? I'd say no, no matter what eventual good may come out of it in the end for some. I'll go farther to say that this is not just me, but rather a pretty universal human moral sentiment. How then can our moral sense come from God? ETA: keep in mind that I am talking about the Calvinist view of God here, not the one that says evil and eternal torment are a result of man's free will.

hmmm... well this Christian doesn't hold a Calvinist view so I think I wouldn't be the best one to have this discussion with.

I will just let you all hash it out

[Smokering]

My husband reminded me yesterday that he discussed this topic fairly recently in depth on his blog. Him being smarter than me and all, and me having a three-course dinner for nine to cook within the next five and a half hours, I'll cheat and direct you here, here and here.

The acts may be good or bad depending on context, but the moral principles do not change depending on context. The reason why it is good for Mr. Smith to have sex with Mrs Smith but bad for Mr. Jones to do the same is because Mr. Jones would be committing adultery whereas Mr. Smith is not. The basic moral value -- that adultery is wrong -- does not change in that situation. Same with murder -- it is always bad. If someone is aiming a gun at your child, killing that person is a necessary evil, not a "good". (If God is all Good, by definition He can't do acts that are "necessary evil". He can change the circumstances so there is a Good solution. We as humans don't have that power.) Dooming a sentient being to eternal torment -- always bad, no matter how unconditioned and omnipotent the being is that is doing the dooming.

If we're getting morality from the Bible here, we can safely say that adultery and murder are always wrong for humans; the Bible doesn't address whether or not they'd be wrong for God, as applying those concepts to God is nonsensical. But nowhere in the Bible does it say "dooming a sentient being to eternal torment is always bad", so where do you get that statement from? Intuition? We've covered that. The principle that harm/pain equals evil? Not Biblical. You need to prove the statement, not just assert it.

[Thao]

I get it from Jesus' statement that the law (= morality) is summed up in loving God with all your heart and loving others as yourself.

But again, my main argument isn't that. My main argument is

The Bible portrays God as Ultimate Good and Ultimate Love in nature and commands us to be like Him. But if His Goodness and Love are so different from ours as to be the opposite of ours (i.e. genocide is good), such injunctions seem absurd.

In other words, I'm not buying your argument that is is nonsensical to apply moral concepts to God, as the Bible repeatedly makes the connection between God's nature and human morality.

Hope your dinnner went great!

[Bluegoat]

I don't think anyone would argue that the difference between what God is like and what we are like means that some actions that would be evil if we did them, could be ok for God. But I think those occasions are circumstantial. We could say in those cases that it seems God does evil, but that is due to an inability for us to see the big picture.

God is a purely actual being, and perfectly himself. He can't be less than himself or opposit to himself, and he is Truth. So what we call goodness is acting in accordance with Truth, for example we don't say the red apple is blue, because that would be a lie, or commit adultery, another kind of lie. By this understanding, evil is acting out of accordance with truth. Of course, we might find some strange things are Truth in a way we didn't expect, but I think overall we can expect a kind of consistency in them.

Now, if we do a thought experiment and take humans out of the equation, look at the world God created. What would it look like? I would suggest that animals, plants, and the elements would all have perfect justice according to their natures. Dogs would not commit untruthes by meowing, nor would plants start turning food into sunlight.

(An interesting question is would this world be like what is pictured in the Garden, since we tend to believe that the current state of nature reflects the Fall.)

Now, let's say God puts some people in there, rational animals. What would they do? Well, I think they would act truly as well, they would do what their rationality told them was Truth. If they went around doing irrational things, it would be rather like a meowing dog. Could God create an untruth? Even if their understanding was limited, that would not be the same as committing an evil act, it would be more like a dog falling off a cliff because he didn't notice it.

Now, if these people can, rationally, comprehend the idea that they can act against Truth, that is a strange and interesting thing, and certainly makes them quite different from the other animals. It would seem to allow for the possibility that they might actually do so, though of course it would in a real way be an irrational act.

It seems to me that the Calvinist explanation gives us in this situation a God who has made a creature that he has created with the express purpose of going against it's own nature. It knows Truth, and therefore does untruth because God has created it that way.

The other possibility is that God has given the creature a kind of freedom to act on its moral comprehension of Truth or not-Truth. A kind of interior space to see Truth and cling to it or reject it.

This also seems strange, but not, perhaps, a contradiction. I can't see any logical reason why God could not give such a power to a creature. Would he though? Well, perhaps if that comprehension, that ability to choose, in some way reflected his nature, that is, it is Truth. Personally, I would say that the part of his being it would reflect is Love. That is, Truth and Love are really one thing, but rational Love seems to require a strange sort of freedom. But I think it would continue to be a bit of a mystery. I think the difference with the Calvinist model is that in this case, the creature has the express purpose of following it's nature and choosing Truth.

Of course, in this case God would still know the ultimate result would mean that some would go against Truth, but I don't think that means that that choice was God's, and there are lots of good solid philosophical discussions on that topic.

The other difficultuy people sometimes have is that we don't seem to be completely free in these moral choices. The answer to this point historically has been that only Adam and Eve were really free in the choice, we are affected by the results of their choice which affected creation, made it cloudy and our bodies unreliable. I tend to think this is a not-suprising effect of choosing not-Truth.

So, if our free choices are less free, does that mean we are fully culpable then for them? There are generally two answers to this, and some use both. One is that God knows to what extent are choices were really free, and only holds us to them that far. The other is that he "arranged" creation for us in such a way that are choices would be free, that is we do not face anything that the restriction on our freedom created by the fall will not allow us to deal with.

I think though that it is true that for an individual, continually choosing not-Truth makes it harder and harder to perceive and chose Truth, and in that they are experiencing the effects of their own actions. I think that can result in a real inability to choose God, and that is likely one thing that is meant by the sin against the Holy Ghost.

[Smokering]

It seems to me that the Calvinist explanation gives us in this situation a God who has made a creature that he has created with the express purpose of going against it's own nature. It knows Truth, and therefore does untruth because God has created it that way.

Well, the Calvinist conception of original sin would say that God creates all humans (post-Fall) with natures that are un-Truthwards, and that it is only by regeneration that some humans gain new natures that are Truthwards.

This also seems strange, but not, perhaps, a contradiction. I can't see any logical reason why God could not give such a power to a creature. Would he though? Well, perhaps if that comprehension, that ability to choose, in some way reflected his nature, that is, it is Truth. Personally, I would say that the part of his being it would reflect is Love. That is, Truth and Love are really one thing, but rational Love seems to require a strange sort of freedom. But I think it would continue to be a bit of a mystery. I think the difference with the Calvinist model is that in this case, the creature has the express purpose of following it's nature and choosing Truth.

I think there is a problem with LFW - it impacts on God's sovereignty. If God is not, in fact, truly in control of everything - if there's a place where He can't go - if His plans for human salvation are held hostage by the will of man - can He truly be called God? When I mentioned that Arminianism seems to be flirting with dualism, this is what I mean - not God vs the devil, but God vs free will; God vs humanity, if you like. God cannot accomplish His purposes if a few humans decide not to become Christians. I've heard the argument that God simply "withholds" His sovereignty in circumstances involving free will, but I don't buy it; I think sovereignty is intrinsic to God. It's like God temporarily suspending His holiness or His omniscience; I don't think He can. (There's the issue of the Incarnation, I suppose, but even if Jesus gave up some God-attributes the Father and Spirit still possessed them; and besides, I don't see any indication in the Gospels that sovereignty was one of the things Jesus gave up!)

There's also the fact that human choices can be mundane and practical as well as spiritual and salvation-related. If God plans to, say, cause the Anglican Church to be founded, does that not mean that under a LFW model He was sitting in heaven drumming His fingers, waiting to see if Henry VIII would get sick of his latest wife? Doesn't it mean that a significant chunk of world history was up to Henry, not God? That if Henry decided he'd found true love after all, God would have been in the position of saying "Drat, well, I'll keep an eye out for more favourable circumstances so I can accomplish My will; maybe the Pope will have a change of heart"?

Now, I've also heard that God only interferes with LFW is certain instances; which allows for a more natural exegesis of, say, the Pharaoh incident in Exodus. But two problems them arise: firstly, if God can "legitimately" interfere sometimes, why not always?; and secondly, if God can hold Pharaoh culpable for sins caused by God, why can't He do the same to other humans?

I also disagree that love requires freedom in the sense you say. I didn't "choose" to fall in love with my husband; still less did I choose to love my daughter; even less, arguably, did she choose to love me (and even as a one-year-old, I believe she does). If someone were to order me to stop loving them or doom the world to zombies, I couldn't do it. It isn't a choice! Now, I agree that love can't be coerced. But causation, not coercion, is the Calvinist model. God doesn't override the wills of the elect, as if there were a kernel of "real" nature hidden inside Christians crying "Let me out, I don't want this!"; He changes those wills so they sincerely want to love Him.

I also think LFW has some odd implications for God's foreknowledge. I'll see if I can look up the argument DH mentioned once, which he said means perfect definite foreknowledge implies determinism.

[Bluegoat]

Originally Posted by Smokering

Well, the Calvinist conception of original sin would say that God creates all humans (post-Fall) with natures that are un-Truthwards, and that it is only by regeneration that some humans gain new natures that are Truthwards.

But before the Fall? I think that is probably the more important point here, because we know that our current state has been compromised.

I think there is a problem with LFW - it impacts on God's sovereignty. If God is not, in fact, truly in control of everything - if there's a place where He can't go - if His plans for human salvation are held hostage by the will of man - can He truly be called God? When I mentioned that Arminianism seems to be flirting with dualism, this is what I mean - not God vs the devil, but God vs free will; God vs humanity, if you like. God cannot accomplish His purposes if a few humans decide not to become Christians. I've heard the argument that God simply "withholds" His sovereignty in circumstances involving free will, but I don't buy it; I think sovereignty is intrinsic to God. It's like God temporarily suspending His holiness or His omniscience; I don't think He can. (There's the issue of the Incarnation, I suppose, but even if Jesus gave up some God-attributes the Father and Spirit still possessed them; and besides, I don't see any indication in the Gospels that sovereignty was one of the things Jesus gave up!)

There's also the fact that human choices can be mundane and practical as well as spiritual and salvation-related. If God plans to, say, cause the Anglican Church to be founded, does that not mean that under a LFW model He was sitting in heaven drumming His fingers, waiting to see if Henry VIII would get sick of his latest wife? Doesn't it mean that a significant chunk of world history was up to Henry, not God? That if Henry decided he'd found true love after all, God would have been in the position of saying "Drat, well, I'll keep an eye out for more favourable circumstances so I can accomplish My will; maybe the Pope will have a change of heart"?

There are lots of indications that Christ gave up his omniscience, that he did not know what was going to happen, or what people were thinking in many instances. Some might consider the Crucifixion to be a matter of giving up his omnipotence, or the temptation incident.

There is also an example that is traditionally used to show that an "alternate ending" is possible; in Matthew 11 where Christ says that had there been miracles in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented. If Christ was telling the truth, it suggests that there is more than one possibility, even if there is only one actuality.

As far as the problem of God not being able to accomplish his plans if there is free-will - I don't think this is an issue at all, because it isn't as if God is waiting around to see what will happen. He is of course outside of time and knows what happens, and can actually arrange things so they work out to accomplish his ends while still allowing individuals freedom. To put it another way, God is not hostage to that freedom, but rather that freedom is taken up into God. Boethius gives the most eloquent explanation of this in The Consolation of Philosophy.

Now, I've also heard that God only interferes with LFW is certain instances; which allows for a more natural exegesis of, say, the Pharaoh incident in Exodus. But two problems them arise: firstly, if God can "legitimately" interfere sometimes, why not always?; and secondly, if God can hold Pharaoh culpable for sins caused by God, why can't He do the same to other humans?

I think the simple answer is he could legitimately interfere anytime he wanted to, but he doesn't. I'm not sure that we know that Pharaoh was actually held culpable for his actions against the Israelites, so I wouldn't tend to comment on that at all. However, if we want to say he was acting in some sense freely, one possible explanation is that God acted here by making sure that the person who was Pharaoh at that time was a person who would freely choose to be a big jerk. So for an analogy (which will only go so far) we can imagine a kind of chessboard, where the pieces all move according to their own desires/decisions But the things we don't have choice over, such as when we are born, where, and so on, can all legitimately be influenced by God. That is, he gets to decide how to set up the board, and the forces at work upon it. Perhaps we could even say that God decides if we are Rooks or Pawns, and so we work within those boundaries in making our choices. God can make sure the right person is in the right place at the right time.

Perhaps we could even say that God decides if we are Rooks or Pawns, and so we work within those boundries in making our choices.I also disagree that love requires freedom in the sense you say. I didn't "choose" to fall in love with my husband; still less did I choose to love my daughter; even less, arguably, did she choose to love me (and even as a one-year-old, I believe she does). If someone were to order me to stop loving them or doom the world to zombies, I couldn't do it. It isn't a choice! Now, I agree that love can't be coerced. But causation, not coercion, is the Calvinist model. God doesn't override the wills of the elect, as if there were a kernel of "real" nature hidden inside Christians crying "Let me out, I don't want this!"; He changes those wills so they sincerely want to love Him. Perhaps we could even say that God decides if we are Rooks or Pawns, and so we work within those boundries in making our choices.

What you are talking about here is not really human love though, rather it is the kind of love we have in common with other animals, emotional love. It's a real thing, and has many good qualities, for example it shows us how we should act towards everybody - especially those we are obliged to love but actually dislike, or perhaps don't know.

Uniquely Human love is something we decide to do rationally, it is an act of will. I am obliged to love my neighbor, which means that I will his good, I behave in a certain way toward him, I have a kind of openness of heart toward him. I am obliged to love God, though he is very abstract and doesn't seem a good object for my affections. And we are obliged to love husbands too, even if we are not in love with them, or don't much like them. An arranged marriage, for example, still requires the individuals involved to love each other, even though they don't know each other, and there is really nothing in Christianity to say that arranged marriages are bad, though they are not our custom.

I also think LFW has some odd implications for God's foreknowledge. I'll see if I can look up the argument DH mentioned once, which he said means perfect definite foreknowledge implies determinism.

I can only advise reading Boethius on this, as it is the main topic of the Consolation, but I don't see how it causes a problem - God can know what we will choose without interfering in our choice.

[Smokering]

But before the Fall? I think that is probably the more important point here, because we know that our current state has been compromised.

Mm. I know some Calvinists believe Adam and Eve had free will; I don't, in the sense that I believe the Fall was divinely decreed. Their natures, though? "Very good" but not perfect, I guess. Not hampered by inherited sin, but obviously still capable of sinning.

There are lots of indications that Christ gave up his omniscience, that he did not know what was going to happen, or what people were thinking in many instances. Some might consider the Crucifixion to be a matter of giving up his omnipotence, or the temptation incident.

OK, but as I said, the Father and Spirit retained those properties. Had God as a whole ceased to be omnipotent or omniscient... well, I'm not sure that's possible. The universe would have imploded or something.

There is also an example that is traditionally used to show that an "alternate ending" is possible; in Matthew 11 where Christ says that had there been miracles in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented. If Christ was telling the truth, it suggests that there is more than one possibility, even if there is only one actuality.

My husband addresses that here (comment 1:13PM).

As far as the problem of God not being able to accomplish his plans if there is free-will - I don't think this is an issue at all, because it isn't as if God is waiting around to see what will happen. He is of course outside of time and knows what happens, and can actually arrange things so they work out to accomplish his ends while still allowing individuals freedom. To put it another way, God is not hostage to that freedom, but rather that freedom is taken up into God. Boethius gives the most eloquent explanation of this in The Consolation of Philosophy.

Arranges what things? Even things like when and where people will be born are dependent on people's free will under a LFW view. My mother and father freely chose to move to New Zealand, where my little sister was born; therefore either her place of birth was dependent on them, not God, or they didn't freely chose because God predetermined they would move to NZ. Predestination and LFW don't just apply to "religious" choices and decisions, but to all decisions, major and minor, mundane and secular... what socks to put on, who to marry, which plane to take. Even nder a LFW worldview "things" don't happen outside God's control - natural disasters, weather patterns etc. So either God causes the circumstances which impact on people's decisions (say, by causing a hurricane which prompts a family to move house), in which case their decisions are not truly "free" - or... what?

I think the simple answer is he could legitimately interfere anytime he wanted to, but he doesn't. I'm not sure that we know that Pharaoh was actually held culpable for his actions against the Israelites, so I wouldn't tend to comment on that at all. However, if we want to say he was acting in some sense freely, one possible explanation is that God acted here by making sure that the person who was Pharaoh at that time was a person who would freely choose to be a big jerk. So for an analogy (which will only go so far) we can imagine a kind of chessboard, where the pieces all move according to their own desires/decisions But the things we don't have choice over, such as when we are born, where, and so on, can all legitimately be influenced by God. That is, he gets to decide how to set up the board, and the forces at work upon it. Perhaps we could even say that God decides if we are Rooks or Pawns, and so we work within those boundaries in making our choices. God can make sure the right person is in the right place at the right time.

But again: the reason Pharaoh was Pharaoh at that time was due to human decisions - who his father chose to sleep with, who his father married, who assassinated who, who overthrew whom. But perhaps more to the point, the Bible is very specific that Pharaoh didn't just happen to be a big jerk. God hardened his heart - it says so about a dozen times throughout the Plague episodes.

What you are talking about here is not really human love though, rather it is the kind of love we have in common with other animals, emotional love. It's a real thing, and has many good qualities, for example it shows us how we should act towards everybody - especially those we are obliged to love but actually dislike, or perhaps don't know.

OK, I get that there are different types of love (although I'd still call emotional love "human" as I think there's more to it than imply animal instinct); but saying that love is an act of will in no way implies that that will must be free. The choices are between LFW and Divinely-caused free-seeming will, not between LFW and Divinely-coerced will.

I can only advise reading Boethius on this, as it is the main topic of the Consolation, but I don't see how it causes a problem - God can know what we will choose without interfering in our choice.

So, does God definitely know what we will choose? In that case, it is logically if not temporally "set" - it would be impossible for us to choose otherwise. Therefore, how is it free?

[Bluegoat]

Originally Posted by Smokering

So, does God definitely know what we will choose? In that case, it is logically if not temporally "set" - it would be impossible for us to choose otherwise. Therefore, how is it free?

I'll just address this, since I think it pretty much sums up your whole post.

Because God knows what we choose, does not mean that it is impossible for us to choose otherwise.

The only way I can see this being argued is if you imagine God knowing what you choose before you choose it - which would still not "set" the choice but I suppose it might seem like it. But really, that is not the best way to think of it. God knows the choice you make because he sees you make it at the time that you make it. God exists fully at all times, and sees each choice as it occurs. (Even to describe it this way is slightly inaccurate, because God is atemporal.) It is only logically "set" in the sense that we have made that choice, and can't unmake it, which would even be true in a universe without God, if such a thing were possible.

As far as God arranging things as required so that they fall out as he needs them to - yes, of course that would include all kinds of things, including non-moral choices, if required. And there is no reason that he could not do this in a way that also respected the free will of the individual, unless we say that it would be too complicated a task. However...

There is potentially a lot of freedom within the word "required" in this view. God may have been quite happy whether or not your parents went to NZ, or whether or not anyone ever founded the Church of England (the Orthodox and RCs wouldn't say the same about their churches.) But I think what we need to imagine when we are talking about God accomplishing his ends is a certain end-state, with any number of possible ways to get there. Or another way to put it would be to describe God as the Final End, which all things naturally desire to rest in, according to the path dictated by their nature. If we are talking about creatures with free will, then even that free will will contribute to moving them toward their final end in one fashion or another, and will affect how non-free parts of the system move to their ends.

As for Pharaoh, I think it is hard for us to know exactly what it means that God hardened his heart, so it isn't a huge factor in my understanding of this issue. But for what it's worth, my interpretation is that God did somehow act directly on him to harden his heart, either by some kind of supernatural zap, or giving him indigestion and making him grumpy, or whatever. So he interfered with his free will. I have doubts as to what extent Pharaoh would be considered culpable for those actions in a final judgment, but I am sure God was perfectly fair in any case.

Ultimately, the idea that God can't achieve the end he wants while allowing free-will if that is what he wants, seems to be putting huge limits on what God is and does, ones that can't be clearly proven logically and if true, would make the point of Christianity seem absurd.

[Smokering]

The only way I can see this being argued is if you imagine God knowing what you choose before you choose it - which would still not "set" the choice but I suppose it might seem like it. But really, that is not the best way to think of it. God knows the choice you make because he sees you make it at the time that you make it. God exists fully at all times, and sees each choice as it occurs. (Even to describe it this way is slightly inaccurate, because God is atemporal.) It is only logically "set" in the sense that we have made that choice, and can't unmake it, which would even be true in a universe without God, if such a thing were possible.

But that makes God's knowledge contingent. God is non-contingent in all aspects, including His knowledge (well, under the Calvinist model anyway).

As far as God arranging things as required so that they fall out as he needs them to - yes, of course that would include all kinds of things, including non-moral choices, if required. And there is no reason that he could not do this in a way that also respected the free will of the individual, unless we say that it would be too complicated a task. However...

My argument isn't that it would be "too complicated", but that it is logically and philosophically impossible given the nature of God as revealed in Scripture, and that it is not the methodology Scripture describes. Take this:

There is potentially a lot of freedom within the word "required" in this view. God may have been quite happy whether or not your parents went to NZ, or whether or not anyone ever founded the Church of England (the Orthodox and RCs wouldn't say the same about their churches.) But I think what we need to imagine when we are talking about God accomplishing his ends is a certain end-state, with any number of possible ways to get there. Or another way to put it would be to describe God as the Final End, which all things naturally desire to rest in, according to the path dictated by their nature. If we are talking about creatures with free will, then even that free will will contribute to moving them toward their final end in one fashion or another, and will affect how non-free parts of the system move to their ends.

See, I don't see that as the biblical view of God at all. God isn't just interested in how things turn out in the end - He is intimately involved in every aspect of creation as it unfolds. Take the last few chapters of Job - God describes in painstaking details how He is directly in charge of all sorts of minor, mundane events. The weather, obtaining food for various animals, dawn, watercourses, the flight of the eagle... He doesn't say He lets the animals do what they want, allowing them "free will" to hunt and give birth and fly however they darn well please: He controls it. In comparison to which, a family moving countries or the founding of a very historically important denomination are fairly big events. And as there are many, many instances in the Bible of mundane events having spiritual consequences - say, the fish coming along at the right time to swallow Jonah, or Rahab happening to put flax on her roof for the soldiers to hide under, or Lazarus happening to be exposed to whatever it was that made him fall ill and die. I don't see why one would assume God simply took advantage of those events that simply "happened" to transpire, rather than assuming He directly caused them, given the Biblical pattern of God being in charge of even tiny events.

There's also the problem of small and large events being directly related. If you hold to the view that salvation requires knowledge of Christ (and I do), then it follows that by God's own rules of salvation it is impossible for someone to be saved without hearing the Gospel, which means that, say, someone in an obscure tribe of Africa is dependent on someone else's choice to become a missionary for her salvation. But the Bible says God saves whomever He wills, not whomever He can save because of someone else's choice to become a missionary. And in turn, the choice to become a missionary might be influenced by a host of other "free will" choices, such as an older missionary's choice to give a missionary talk, or a travel brochure to Kenya, or finding a book about missions at a book fair. If God doesn't interfere with any of those choices in order to avoid messing with free will, how is God in control of anything? Where do you draw the line between events God controls and events man controls; and on what basis?

Ultimately, the idea that God can't achieve the end he wants while allowing free-will if that is what he wants, seems to be putting huge limits on what God is and does

Not if the limits are due to God's nature; it isn't "limiting" to say God must be logical, it's just that the alternative is impossible; I'd say the same for sovereignty.

, ones that can't be clearly proven logically

One argument proposed by my husband and expounded upon here:

# Anytime anything is real (R), God alone instantiates it in reality (G).
# A human choice (C) is real.
# Therefore, God alone instantiates a human choice in reality [by modus ponens].

and if true, would make the point of Christianity seem absurd.

How so?

[Thao]

I'm wondering what your biblical basis is for believing that God is logical in nature and so bound by logic? ("logic" here being the Aristotlean (?) logic that you usually refer to.)

[Bluegoat]

Originally Posted by Thao

I'm wondering what your biblical basis is for believing that God is logical in nature and so bound by logic? ("logic" here being the Aristotlean (?) logic that you usually refer to.)

Do we really need one?