Join Date: Jul 2002
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|BUZZFLASH: How could a company steal votes for one party and we would never know about it?
HARRIS: Given inside access, which is available to software engineers and support techs, anything is possible. In California, according to internal memos we have obtained written by Diebold support techs and software engineers, in some elections no one looked at the software code AT ALL, except for a couple of programmers out of Canada. This is because the software that was certified and approved, and supposedly frozen and held in escrow, was replaced with different software for elections. All of the companies seem to do this: They allow their techs, and sometimes even elections officials, to replace or “update” programs, and you can’t count on these “updates” being tested by anyone. In Georgia they did this repeatedly.
Let me explain just how disturbing this is: The Diebold software that has been certified includes something called “GEMS” version 1.11.14 and also GEMS version 1.17.17. However, according to company memos, they rewrote “the guts of the program” when they made GEMS version 1.14.xx and then made even more changes, significant changes, with GEMS version 1.15.xx. (The last two numbers vary; none of these were certified.) These changes were made by programmers in Vancouver, Canada and stuck on an unprotected web site, where support techs went and retrieved them and put them on machines used in elections in California.